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LOMA LINDA UNIVERSITY 
CENTER FOR 
CHRISTIAN BIOETHICS 
Gerald Winslow to Succeed Wil Alexander 
as Religion Dean and Ethics Chair; 
Ivan Blazen to Teach Scripture and Ethics 
Gerald R. Winslow, Professor of Ethics and Chair of the 
Department of Religion at Pacific Union College in Angwin, 
California, has accepted an invitation from the Board ofTrus-
tees of Lorna Linda University to succeed Wil Alexander as 
Dean of the Faculty of Religion and Chair of the Council of 
Consultants for the Center for Christian Bioethics. He will 
assume his new duties at Lorna Linda on January 1, 1994. 
Until the summer of 1994 when he and his family will move to 
Lorna Linda, Winslow will commute by air between Northern 
and Southern California. 
Wil Alexander, who has announced his retirement effec-
tive December 31,1993, has served as Dean of the Faculty of 
Religion at Lorna Linda University since 1990. He has also 
served as Chair of the Council of Consul tants for the Center for 
Christian Bioethics since 1991. A specialist in theology and 
clinical ministry, Alexander will continue to serve the campus 
in his retirement years as Special Assistant to the President for 
Spiritual Life. 
Gerald R. Winslow is a graduate of Walla Walla College 
(BA, 1967), Andrews University (MA, 1968) and the Graduate 
Theological Union in Berkeley, California (PhD, 1979). He 
has done post-doctoral studies at Cambridge University, the 
University of Virginia and the University of Ttibingen. 
A specialist in theological biomedical ethics, Winslow be-
gan his professional life as an Associate Dean ofl'vlen at Walla 
Walla College in College Place, Washington. After three 
fears, he joined the School of Theology at Walla Walla College 
where he served until 1987 . Between 1987 and 1989, Winslow 
was a Professor of Ethics in the Faculty of Religion at Lorna 
Linda University. Since 1989, he has been Professor of Ethics 
and Chair of the Department of Religion at Pacific Union 
College and Senior Research Scholar of the Center for Chris-
tian Bioethics at Lorna Linda University. Winslow has also 
taught at Andrews University, San Francisco Theological 
Seminary and Newbold College in Bracknell, England. He 
has lectured on many other university campuses and served as 
a consultant to a number of medical centers in the United 
States and elsewhere. 
Winslow is the author of many scholarly articles and re-
views. His book, Triage and Justice: The Ethics of Rationing Life-
Saving Medical Resources, was published by the University of 
California Press in 1982. Facing Limits: Ethics and Health Care 
for the Elderly, an anthology he edited with James Walters, 
Professor of Christian Ethics at Lorna Linda University, was 
published by Westview Press in 1992. 
Winslow received the local and the national Thomas and 
Violet Zapara Excellence in Teaching Award in 1992. In 1985, 
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Quality-of-Life 
Is Not A Dirty Word 
Robert D. Orr, MD 
Director of Clinical Ethics 
Loma Linda University Medical Center 
Co-Director, Center for Christian Bioethics 
Loma Linda University 
Many people shy away from using the phrase "quality of 
life." They fear it is an insidious concept creeping into our 
conversations and decisions that is capable of destroying the 
basic tenet of medicine that human life has inherent value. 
But quality oflife is at the very heart of medicine. The reason 
most patients go to their physicians is that they have a problem 
which affects their quality oflife. They expect their physician 
to be able to restore their health and thus improve their quality 
of life. 
One of the problems with using the concept of quality of 
life in medicine is definitional. By "quality," some actually 
mean "utility" in that a person has little quality of life if he or 
she is not productive. Others may take quality to mean 
"worth," i.e., importance to others. Even when people use 
quality to more correctly mean "value to self," there is still the 
problem of defining "life." I\lost quality-of-life discussions 
refer to biological life. When quality of life is deemed to be 
very low, some may say that the individual's personhood is 
gone, and they may then shift the focus from the quality of life 
of the person to that of society. 
For our discussion, quality of life means a personal state-
ment of the positivity or negativity of multiple attributes that 
characterize one's life. It is personal. It is subjective. It may 
be different from person to person. It may change from day to 
day. We will specifically focus on this subjective quality oflife 
of the individual as opposed to the quality of life of his or her 
household or the quality of life of society. 
What are the attributes which you weigh when you are 
trying to evaluate your quality oflife? The several dimensions 
of life include the physical dimension (performance of the 
activities of daily living, self-care, mobility, symptoms), the 
psychological dimension (presence or absence of depression, 
anxiety, anger, hope), the social dimension (relationships, 
activities, recreation), the cognitive dimension (memory, 
alertness, judgment, recognition), and the spiritual dimension 
(peace about the meaning oflife and death). In addition there 
is the general appraisal which may be called life satisfaction. 
Medical professionals often focus only on the physicial 
dimension. I spoke at length a few months ago with a young 
man who had been quadraplegic and ventilator dependent for 
11 years . . My assessment was that he had a rather poor quality 
of life. But when I asked him what it had been like, he 
responded, "It's not been so bad." He went on to tell me of the 
2 
caring and support of his family, the continued relationships 
and activities with friends, his sharp mental capacity and the 
technological capabilities with the use of his voice-activated 
computer. He rated his relational and cognitive dimensions 
higher than his physical limitations. I learned a lot about 
quality of life from him. 
Let's look at the concept of quality of life first in clinical 
medicine, then in the area of research, and finally as it is 
involved in our discussions of public policy. 
Quality of Life at the Bedside 
Quality of life is an important concept at the bedside. 
Nearly every visit to a physician is preceded by the patient' 
personal assessment of his or her present quality of life and 
hopes for their future quality of life. 
It also enters into many bedside ethical dilemmas. The 
"Can we ... ?" questions in medicine are primarily technical 
medical questions. But when patients, families and the health-
care team are wrestling with the "Should we .. . ?" questions, 
they are confronting questions of an ethical nature. Quality of 
life often figures prominently in these discussions. 
In working through these ethical questions, there are at 
least four sets of factors which must be considered by the 
patient, family and health-care team. 1 First they must think of 
the medical factors: what is the diagnosis, the nature of the 
disease process, the condition of the patient, the prognosis 
and, putting these all together, what are the treatment op-
tions? These are primarily factual, but the physician's values 
and experience may enter into his or her assessment of the 
prognosis and recommended treatment options. 
The second factor is the patient's preferences; what are the 
patient's values, goals and specific treatment desires? When 
the patient has decision-making capacity, this information 
may be elicited from the patient. It is part of the physician's 
responsibility to see that the patient is adequately informed 
about the medical facts and also to assure that the patient is not 
being coerced by other people or by external constraints. The 
patient's own assessment of her quality oflife will clearly ente'" 
into her preferences. 
When the patient has lost decision-making capacity, the 
team should try to learn what the patient would choose if he 
were able. We often rely on written documents, previous oral 
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statements, and previous personal choices to make this "sub-
stituted judgment." But whatever method we use, we are 
rying to make the decision the patient would make, not the 
decision which the family or the health -care team would make 
either for themselves or for the patient. 
There have been several disquieting empiric studies pub-
lished in the past four or five years which raise serious ques-
tions about whether either family members or health-care 
professionals are able (or willing?) to accurately express pa-
tients' previously stated desires about treatment.2,3,4,S This 
hallowed concept of substituted judgment upon which we 
have traditionally relied in the practice of medicine and upon 
which most courts have relied to make difficult limitation-of 
-treatment decisions may not be as solid ground as we have 
assumed. 
These two factors, medical indications and patient prefer-
ences, are primary ~md are sufficient to allow informed deci-
sion -making in most clinical encounters. Sometimes, however, 
the medical outlook is very poor and we have no idea what the 
patient would want. We still must make a decision even 
though these two primary factors do not lead to a clear answer. 
We then rely on the other two sets of factors which are quality 
of life and contextual features. Because of the prominence 
given to personal choice in our society, it is recognized that we 
are employing a lower ethical standard when we are forced to 
use these factors to reach a bedside decision. 
When anyone other than the patient is using his or her own 
ssessmentofthe patient's quality oflife to make a decision for 
chat patient, they are using the "best interests" standard rather 
than the "substituted judgment" standard discussed earlier. 
We are transgressing our stated definition of quality of life as 
a personal, subjective evaluation when we try to substitute an 
external, and supposedly objective, evaluation. Who should 
make this objective, but qualitative, decision: the family, the 
health-care team, an appointed patient advocate, an ethics 
committee, or a probate judge? And further, what standards 
should this proxy use to assess the patient's quality oflife? The 
two most commonly mentioned are the patient's suffering 
(both actual and capacity) and the patient's ability to relate to 
others in their environment. These are both very subjective 
factors; extremely difficult to quantify, and even more difficult 
to weigh. What we are really asking is, "What would most 
people want if they were in this situation?" And we are trying 
to wrestle at the bedside with the difficult question of whether 
there is a minimum acceptable quality oflife below which the 
health-care team and society are not obligated to provide life-
extending treatment. 
The fourth and final set of factors which may enter into 
bedside decision-making are contextual features. What im-
pact will the decision have on others; on the family, the care 
team, and on society as a whole? Are there cultural, legal, 
financial or institutional factors which should be considered 
orior to this specific bedside decision? 
/ 
Quality of Life in Research 
Perhaps because of, but at least coincident with, the in-
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creased interest in quality oflife as it affects bedside decisions, 
there has been a remarkable increase in the use of quality of 
life in medical research.6 In the past, the outcome variables 
measured in research were morbidity and mortality. In recent 
years, however, attempts have been made to measure the 
impact of various treatments on the patient's quality of life as 
well. This measurement is particularly useful when there are 
several equally effective therapies, or when there are slight 
differences in survival between therapies, or when a proposed 
therapy is effective, but risky or toxic, or finally when the 
proposed therapy is costly or lifelong, the patients are 
asymptomatic, and the disease complication rate is low. 
Dozens of scales have been devised, used and reported in 
the literature to assess the quality of life of research subjects. 
Some of these are designed for specific diseases or for specific 
treament modalities. Some measure performance, others 
measure symptoms, others measure satisfaction, etc. None is 
clearly adequate as an overall measure of quality of life. 
Quality of life is a very important outcome variable in 
medical research, but is very difficult to measure and even 
more difficult to compare. 
Quality of Life in Public Policy 
When quality of life enters into discussions of public 
policy, we must recognize that we are talking on a different 
plane because of the differing perspectives of medical practice 
and health policy. In clinical practice we think of individual 
lives with personal concerns, whereas in health policy we think 
of statistical lives and have concerns about effectiveness. In 
the former we assess each case as it comes, in the latter we 
establish policies which can be applied more or less dispas-
sionately to specific cases. In the former we are patient 
advocates, in the latter we are concerned about the good of 
society. 
It is important to recognize this difference because physi-
cians sometimes make different recommendations for identi-
fied patients than they would make for groups of theoretical 
patients. Redelmeier and Tversky showed that not only do 
physicians often make different decisions for individuals than 
for groups, but they recognize that they do this, and in addi-
tion, non-physicians recognize that physicians do this and they 
expect them to continue to do this. 7 Physicians are bedside 
advocates for their patients. 
Health planners, however, have a societal perspective. 
They are most concerned with whether a treatment works, 
how much it costs, and whether the benefit is worth the cost. 
They measure effectiveness in "Life-years" and cost in dollars, 
and try to determine cost-effectiveness by the number of 
dollars it takes to extend a patient's life by one year. We 
sometimes contemptuously accuse them of trying to place a 
dollar value on life, when in fact, they are merely trying to do 
their assigned task of prioritizing funding. 
In recent years, this cost-effective reasoning has been 
expanded to include assessments of quality oflife. New scales 
have been devised such as the "Quality-Adjusted Life Year" 
continued on page 7 
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How Secret Should 
A Patient's Secrets Be? 
Duties to Warn and 
Reasons for Reticence 
Leigh C. Bishop, M.D. 
Ass()ciate Professor of Psychiatry 
Loma Linda University School of Medicine 
Loma Linda, California 
How secret should a patient's secrets be? According to the 
International Code of .Medical Ethics of the World Medical 
Association, the answer is "absolute."! That is, all information 
confided to a physician by a patient is regarded as absolutely 
confidential. My own guess is that this reflects the sensitivity 
of an international professional organization to the possibili-
ties of the political abuse of medical privileges. But in this 
country at least, and in most codes of medical ethics, confi-
dentiality-while given appropriately high regard-is not guarded 
by absolute rules. 
A high regard for medical confidentiality appears to be 
grounded, within our own society, in our recognition of some-
thing like a right to privacy. Privacy, it is true, may be a 
fundamental human need in itself; and accordingly the right to 
privacy may be regarded as a fundamental right in and of itself. 
But in contemporary moral theory, the rights of privacy and 
confidentiality are most frequently asserted on grounds re-
lated to individual autonomy. That is to say, we tend to 
express the value of privacy and confidentiality in terms of the 
respect due to persons as having value in and of themselves-
as being ends in themselves and not merely means to some 
other end. It is an argument which, of course, takes us back to 
Kant and his Groundwork. 
But rules of confidentiality can be defended, and have 
been, not only on deontological grounds-that is, on the basis 
of how we ought to treat other people. They may also be 
defended on consequentialist principles-on the basis of 
achieving some overarching goal or state of affairs. Indeed, it 
was primarily a utilitarian defense of the rule of confidentiality 
which guided both the majority and dissenting opinions in the 
Tarasoff judgment.2 The majority opinion held that an 
overarching social good- the preservation of public safety-is 
best served by breaching medical confidentiality in case there 
exists a threat to that safety. The dissenting opinion held that 
the overarching social good, including the public's safety, is 
likely to be sacrificed when treatment of potentially violent 
individuals is impaired by judicially mandated breaches of 
confidentiality. 
4 
A Legal Perspective 
Barbara Rostholder Saltzman, RN, MSN, CS, JD 
Clinical Specialist in Psychiatric Mental Health Nursing 
Los Angeles County Bar Bioethics Committee 
California Nurses Association Ethics Committee 
Ethics Committee, Jewish Home for the Aging 
At first blush, the issue of patient confidentiality appears 
simple, given professional codes such as those of the American 
Nurses Association and the American Medical Association 
which address the issue. However, since codes require in-
terpretation to implement them in often complex situations, it 
is important to understand the nature of confidentiality, po-
tential impediments to its maintenance, and relevant ethical 
and legal concerns. 
Bok defines confidentiality as "the boundaries surround 
ing shared secrets and the process of guarding these bound-
aries."! Confidentiality is broader than privacy in that it may 
encompass matters which are not actually private, but that the 
patient may wish "to keep from the knowledge of third 
parties."2 
Confidentiality may be justified by four premises. These 
include autonomy regarding personal information, respect for 
relationships, respect for promises that protect shared infor-
mation, and the benefits of confidentiality to those in need of 
advice, sanctuary, and aid.3 
While the primary loyalty of physicians, nurses, and other 
health-care providers is to their patients, duties owed to 
patients sometimes conflict directly with legitimate obligations 
to others. One example is where a patient may harm a third 
party. If the physician were to honor a duty of confidentiality, 
the moral obligation to the third party would be breached. 
Such conflicting moral obligations often create ethical dilem-
mas.4 
Case law provides an important exception to confidential-
ity regarding a patient's threat to harm a specific intended 
victim. The therapist has a duty to warn the intended victim 
of a patient who presents a serious danger of violence.s 
Unless there is a legal or policy requirement to handle 
confidential material in a specific manner, it becomes neces-
sary to balance conflicting obligations. Even with a lega,1 
mandate, professional judgment is needed to determin~ 
whether the situation falls within the law. 
In general, confidentiality protects patients' secrets. 
However, sometimes secrecy may be used as a shield to 
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Duties to Warn-continued 
( However the courts have ruled in that case or others, I think Lhat we in medicine and psychiatry, by our own tradition of 
values if nothing else, tend to regard confidentiality as more 
closely related to concerns about autonomy than to concerns 
about social consequences. In the matter of confidentiality, 
we tend to be moved more readily by appeals to respect for 
persons. For it is individual persons with whom we chiefly 
relate in our daily practice. It is individual persons whose 
secrets we hear, and with whom we empathize. And yet we 
may find ourselves at conflict in any case, because our duty as 
physicians has to do with social goods, in the form of public 
health, as well. 
Overarching social good may 
in rare cases demand the 
sacrifice of personal privacy. 
Given these considerations, we tend to regard the rule of 
confidentiality as being, if not an absolute duty, at least a prima 
facie duty. This means that we generally regard confidenti-
ality as something which should only be breached when we 
have a sufficiently strong and compelling reason to do so. 
Those who choose to breach confidentiality thus bear the 
burden of proof in morally justifying such a disclosure. There 
are relatively few serious dissenters from this high regard for 
confidentiality; the disagreement comes in specifying exactly 
which conditions are adequate to justify exceptions to the rule 
of confidentiality. 
For psychiatrists, of course, the topic of confidentiality 
almost immediately calls to mind the Tarasoff case, and the 
"duty to warn" which was legally established for the first time 
by that ruling. Consider the following rather typical case in 
which Tarasoff responsibilities are relevant: 
A 35-year-old mother of three was being seen indi-
vidually in an attempt to address unresolved marital 
conflict brought on by the discovery of her husband's 
affair. While not psychotic, this patient demonstrated 
features of a paranoid personality disorder. Her 
characterologic suspiciousness and aggression provided 
the context for ongoing and intense rage toward the 
husband's lover, long after the illicit relationship had 
been terminated. The patient had shared with the 
therapist her vengeful feelings ' and fantasies. She 
appeared to be in control of her aggression until one day 
she reported that she had been overcome with rage at 
the suspicion that this other woman might try to call the 
husband again. She declared that if this woman did so, 
she would kill her. After exploring this with the patient, 
and satisfying himself that her threat was not an idle 
one, the psychiatrist informed the patient that he was 
legally obliged to notify the threatened party of a 
continued on page 6 
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A Legal Perspective-continued 
protect health-care providers. Keeping secrets to prevent 
disclosure of patient-care mistakes is a misuse of confidenti-
ality.6 
Numerous factors decrease the likelihood of a patient's 
secrets remaining secret. Increasing numbers of health-care 
providers are involved in patient care. The American College 
of Hospital Administrators has determined that an average of 
seventy-five people in major hospitals have legitimate access 
to patient records.7 
Computerization and facsimile distribution of medical 
records, as well as the common practice of storing charts and 
parts of the record in open areas, contribute to the erosion of 
confidentiality. Access to computer records by hackers could 
lead to stealing private information or adding false data.S 
National insurance data banks are used by the majority of 
insurance companies to store medical and other information 
obtained during application for health or life insurance. Once 
records are stored in data banks, they are available to other 
participating insurance companies.9 
Involvement of family or friends in patient-treatment de-
cisions, either informally or formally through a previously 
executed durable power of attorney for health, may result in 
the disclosure of more information than the patient wishes. 
Health-care providers must anticipate these issues and en-
courage patients to clarify parameters early in the treatment 
process. 
Genetic testing and treatment create conflicts when other 
family members are needed for test protocols or decision 
making and the designated patient wishes to maintain secrecy. 
Some confidentiality issues have been addressed by poli-
cies, procedures, and/or legal precedent. Widespread photo-
graphing and videotaping of medical events is of concern, 
since most invasion of privacy lawsuits are related to picture-
taking. lO Disclosure during the informed consent process 
must be broad enough to cover the actual intended use of the 
photograph or videotape. 11 
Personal patient information should be released to the 
media only by the designated knowledgeable employee. If 
the patient is in the public eye due to being a disaster victim 
or in the public domain as a celebrity, more information may 
be permissibly released than where the patient is not a public 
figure.1 2 
Conflicting values may take precedence over confidenti-
ality. States often have reporting requirements for commu-
nicable diseases, gunshot and stab wounds, child and elder 
abuse, and epilepsy. Government agencies such as the Internal 
Revenue Service and the Department of Health and Human 
Services can require release of confidential information. 13 
Exceptions to confidentiality include disclosure with the 
patient's consent, communication to other health-team mem-
bers caring for the patient, quality improvement activities, and 
disclosure in court when there is no privileged communication 
or when the patient waives the privilege.14 
The psychotherapist-patient privilege is held by the patient 
and therefore may only be waived by the patient. In California 
this privilege has recently been extended to cover confidential 
continued on page 6 
5 
Duties to Warn-continued from page 5 
possible danger. The patient somewhat feebly at-
tempted to discount the seriousness of her intent, but 
finally agreed to supply the therapist with the tele-
phone number of the threatened party. The psychia-
trist subsequently contacted the endangered party by 
telephone and mail to inform her of the threat. This 
case posed something of a challenge ethically, however, 
when the threatened party called the psychiatrist about 
six weeks later to report that the patient had just 
repeated her threat by telephone. What should she do, 
she inquired, and was the patient's condition such that 
the threats should be taken seriously at this later date? 
Since the psychiatrist felt that the inquiry might actu-
ally represent a bid for information about the patient, 
he felt that he \\:,as in something of an ethical dilemma. 
He elected to recommend-without disclosing any in-
formation about his patient-that the caller take any and 
all threats seriously, and that she contact local public 
safety officials to ascertain the best means for assuring 
her own safety. It was noted that the frequency of the 
patient's visits and her rapport with the psychiatrist 
both declined following the fulfillment of Tarasoff 
duties. She was eventually lost to follow-up. 
This case demonstrates a not infrequent result of honoring 
the Tarasoff obligation: damage to the alliance between 
psychiatrist and patient, with impairment of the therapeutic 
effort. This kind of result tends to give credence to the 
concerns voiced by Justice Clark in his dissenting opinion in 
Tarasoff. But it should be noted that such an outcome need 
not always be the case. Appropriate exploration of the patient 's 
feelings of betrayal may avert therapeutic breakdown in some 
cases, and I am aware of instances in which the resolution of 
conflict introduced by a Tarasoff-type warning actually led to 
an enhanced therapeutic relationship. However, the risk of 
such damage to the therapeutic effort serves to highlight the 
uneasiness with which many psychiatrists bear their duty to 
warn. Already an agent of society by virtue of his power to 
confine the dangerously violent patient, the psychiatrist's 
work is not made any easier by Tarasoff responsibilities. As a 
psychiatrist, I am one who trained and entered practice in the 
post-Tarasoff era. I am not entirely comfortable with being an 
agent of social control, but I cannot imagine a workable 
arrangement which would entirely liberate psychiatrists from 
some kind of duty to warn. And so I view my discomfort as the 
unavoidable price that I, and others who share the feeling, 
must pay for the privilege of practicing psychiatric medicine. 
Another major area of present concern regarding patient 
confidentiality is, of course, the confidentiality of the patient 
who is HIV positive. Here again, the ideal of preserving 
patient confidentiality is often challenged in terms that appeal 
to the public welfare, or at least to the welfare of those who, it 
is usually argued, are at some risk-however small- of infec-
tious contact with the HIV -positive patient. The usually small 
risk of actual exposure to HIV under most circumstances 
continued on page 7 
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A Legal Persptective-continued from page 5 
communications between patients and masters-prepared psy-
chiatric-mental health nurses.1 5 
Nowhere is the issue of confidentiality more challenging 
than in the care of HIV positive patients. The potential for 
discrimination has led to more safeguards than are usually seen 
for patients with communicable diseases. Health-care pro-
vider access to patients' HIV status and disclosure by providers 
who themselves are HIV positive are but two of the many areas 
evoking legislation, regulation, and/or case law development. 
When health care providers address confidentiality issues, they 
palpate the very heart of their relationships with patients. Only by 
tempering ethical principles and evolving legal codes with a deep 
respect for human dignity can excellent patient care be achieved. 
I Sissela Bok, "T he Professional Secret; T he Li mits of Confidential ity," 13 Hastillgs Center Report 
Feb. 1983, at 24. 
2 Id. at 25. 
3 rd. 
4 Ruth Macklin, Mortal Choices 165 (Pantheon Books 1987). 
5 T arasoff v. Regents of Uniyersity of California, 17 Ca1.3d 425, 435, 131 Cal.Rptr 14, 23, 551 P. 2d 
334, 343 (1 976); but see T om L. Beauchamp & James F. Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics 
333-335,402-03 (3d ed. Oxford University Press 1989). 
6 Bok, supra, at 30. 
7 Ann E. Weiss, Bioethics: Dilemmas i1l Modem Medicille 13 (E nslow Publishers, Inc. 1985). 
8 Id. at 15. 
9 James Endicott, "Absolutely Not Confi dent ial," Hippocrates 55-57 (March/April 1989). 
10 Nurse's Halldbook of Lam' & Ethics 89 (Stanley Loeb at ai, eds., Springhouse 1992). 
IIId. 
12 Wi ll iam W. Feuer, Medical Malpractice Law 10 (Lawprep Press 1990). 
13 Nurse's Handbook of Law & Ethics, supra, at 89-90. 
14 Cynthia E. Northrop & Mary E. Kelly, Legal Issues ill Nursillg461 (The C.V. Mosby Company 
1987). 
15 Cal. Evid. Code Section 1010 (West Supp. 1993) .• 
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Duties to Warn-continued from page 6 
becomes psychologically inflated in the context of the univer-
sally catastrophic result that obtains whenever the small risk is 
realized. This is, of course, the reasoning which drove the fears 
of professional basketball players recently when ~1agic Johnson 
returned to the NBA, and it was what eventually drove him 
into retirement once again. Judging by the response of the 
media to pronouncements by some health officials in the 
~hgic Johnson case, it is currently somewhat fashionable to 
belittle those who fear the very small risk of contracting AIDS. 
\Vhile in no sense wanting to validate unnecessary alarm about 
possible HIV exposure, neither do I feel privileged to make 
light of such anxieties. 
HIV patients well recognize these fears, and they well 
recognize that these fears may be harbored even by those, such 
as medical professiqnals, who are well-informed about AIDS. 
Socrates and the cognitive theorists notwithstanding, knowl-
edge does not always rule over emotion. And so it is not too 
surprising that we find patients requesting, for example, on 
admission to psychiatric units, that their HIV status be kept 
confidential and not disclosed to the nursing staff. Or, to take 
what must be a more frequent occurrence, we find patients 
whose HIV status is known only to an AIDS clinic that they 
have elected to attend, while keeping their HIV status a secret 
from their local physician or other medical consultants. 
Gillon has summarized the various arguments that are 
typically raised in consideration of AIDS and patient confiden-
iality, and I will not repeat them here.3 But it is worth noting 
that the argument to which he finally appeals, in defending the 
preservation of confidentiality even in the most dubious of 
conditions (such as that of the AIDS patient who announces an 
intention to have sex with a known HIV -negative person), is 
the very argument used in the dissenting opinion of Taras off, 
and by many who continue to doubt the wisdom of Tarasoff. 
That is, he appeals to the consequentialist argument that 
physicians will better maintain the trust of high-risk patient 
groups, and thus, ultimately will have greater influence on 
public health, by preserving the confidentiality of HIV-posi-
tive patients under virtually all conditions. By this line of 
reasoning and others, the tendency to preserve the confiden-
tiality of HIV-positive individuals even in the face of appeals 
to the welfare of others has been upheld to a degree unprec-
edented in the history of public health. 
Why does the argument which has failed in Tarasoff now 
carry the day with regard to the confidentiality of HIV patients? 
I offer two conjectures. The first is that the sheer numbers of HI V-
positive individuals poses a social problem that presently over-
shadows whatever concerns we may have about preserving, in a 
similar fashion, the confidentiality of the threatening psychiatric 
patient. Secondly, there are few serious doubts that the Tarasoff 
duties serve to avert some, and possibly many, catastrophes. But 
there are lingering doubts that analogous disclosures of HIV 
~ tatus , except in certain rare circumstances, will actually result in 
~duced morbidity and mortality. 
1 World Medical Association International Code of I'v1ed ical Ethics, Geneva, 1948. 
2 Tarasoff vs. Regents of the Uniyersity of California, 131 Cal. Rept. 14, 1976. 
3 Gillon, R. AIDS and medical confidentiality. Br. Med JI 294, June 27, 1987 . • 
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(QALY) of Weinstein and Stason, the "leu Treatment En-
titlement Index" of Engelhardt and Rie, or the "Quality of 
Well-Being Scale" of Kaplan and Anderson. All of these use 
some measure of quality of life as a factor in calculating the 
numbers to be used in funding decisions. 
It does make sense that if treatment A will return patients 
to their previous level of good function for the remainder of 
their natural lives and treatment B will save their lives for the 
same number of years but leave them incomaor pain, A should 
be preferred over B. It doesn't take a formula to determine 
that. 
These formulas may be of some value to health planners as 
they assess various modalities of therapy; however, the formu-
las can be discriminatory if applied at the bedside. For 
example if treatment X is applied to a 20-year-old man and 
could only restore 80% of his quality, it might give him 40 
(0.8xSO) QALY's if he could live until age 70. The same 
treatment applied to a 60-year-old woman, even ifit might give 
her 100% quality for 10 years, would only give her 10 QAL Y's. 
Is that adequate reason to offer the treatment to him and deny 
it to her if we are in a competitive situation with scarce 
resources? These formulas are not meant to be bedside tools, 
but are to be used in policy making. 
Conclusion 
Quality of life is not a dirty word. It is an increasingly 
important feature of medical decision-making at the bedside 
and it is being measured and reported more frequently in 
medical research. We must be careful in using it, however, to 
define it carefully and to recognize its imprecise and subjec-
tive nature in these arenas. Equally important, we must be 
cautious when we see it being used in health-policy decisions. 
Even when research data on quality oflife is used as one factor 
in policy recommendations, the imprecision and subjectivity 
carryover and may even be amplified in the public policy 
arena. 
1 Jonsen A, Siegler M, Winslade W. Clinical Ethics 3rd ed., New York, 
McGraw-Hill, 1992. 
2 Uhlmann RF, Pearlman RA. "Physicians' and spouses' predictions 
of elderly patients' resuscitation preferences."lournalo/Gerontology 
1988; 43(5):Ml15-21. 
3 Starr TJ, Pearlman RA, Uhlmann RF. "Quality of life and resus-
citation decisions in elderly patients." lournal 0/ General Internal 
Medicine 1986; 1(6):373-379. 
4 BachJR, Campagnolo 01, Hoeman S. "Life satisfaction of individuals 
with Duchene muscular dystrophy using long-term mechanical 
ventilatory support." Am 1 Phys Med & Rehab 1991; 70(3):129-135. 
5 Pearlman RA, Uhlmann RF, Jecker NS. "Spousal understanding of 
patient quality of life: implications for surrogate decisions." 1 Cli71 
Ethics 1992; 3(2):114-123. 
6 Spitzer WOo "State of science 1986: quality of life and functional 
status as target variables for research." 1 Chron Dis 1987; 40(6):465-
471. 
7 Redelmeier DA, Tversky A. "Discrepancy between medical 
decisions for individual patients and for groups." N Eng 1 Med 
1990;322(16): 1162 .• 
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will move to Southern California in the summer of 1993. He 
will begin teaching on the Lorna Linda campus in the Fall 
quarter of this year. 
Ivan T. Blazen holds three degrees from Andrews Univer-
sity. He received a BA with a major in religion in 1957, an MA 
in Biblical Greek in 1958 and a MDiv with an emphasis on 
New Testament Studies in 1961. He received a PhD in New 
Testament from Princeton Theological Seminary in 1979. He 
has also studied at Union Theological Seminary in New York, 
Drew University and the University of Heidelberg. 
Blazen was a professor in the Department of Religion of the 
College of Arts and Sciences at Andrews University from 1959 
until 1972. Between 1972 and 1988, he served as Professor of 
New Testament and then as Chair of the Department of New 
Testament at the Seventh-day Adventist Theological Semi-
nary of Andrews University. He taught in the Faculty of 
Religion at Lorna Linda University between 1988 and 1990. 
F or the past three years he has been a professor in the 
Department of Religion at Pacific Union College. 
Blazen has published a number of articles in the area of 
New Testament studies and in the field of Christian ethics. 
He is currently writing a book on the Apostle Paul's under-
standing of death. • 
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